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Abstract 1 
Prosocial and normative behavior emerges in early childhood, but substantial changes in 2 
prosocial behavior in middle childhood may be due to it becoming increasingly influenced by 3 
social norms. Here we show that information about what is normative begins influencing 4 
FKLOGUHQ¶VFRVWO\VKDULQJLQPLGGOHFKLOGKRRGin a sample of 6-11 year-old German children. 5 
Information about what is normative was most influential ZKHQLQGLFDWLQJZKDWZDVµULJKW¶LH6 
³WKHULJKWWKLQJLVWRFKRRVHWKLV´,WZDVOHVVLQIOXHQWLDOZKHQLQGLFDWLQJZKDWZDVSUHVFULEHGE\7 
DUXOHLH³WKHUHLVDUXOHWKDWVD\VWRFKRRVHWKLV´RUZKHQLWLQGLFDWHGZKDWWKHPDMRULW\RI8 
SHRSOHGRLH³PRVWSHRSOHFKRRVHWKLV´These findings support the idea that middle 9 
FKLOGKRRGLVZKHQVRFLDOQRUPVEHJLQWRVKDSHFKLOGUHQ¶VFRVWO\VKDULQJDQGSURYLGHLQVLJKWLQWR10 
the psychological foundations of the relationship between norms and prosocial behavior. 11 
Keywords: costly sharing; social norms; middle childhood  12 
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Modeling social norms increasingly influences costly sharing in middle childhood 1 
 2 
Costly prosocial behavior is widespread across human societies and central to their 3 
success (Henrich, 2004). The tendency to act in ways that benefit others emerges early in 4 
childhood (LVHQEHUJ)DEHV	6SLQUDG+DPOLQ.XKOPHLHU'XQILHOG	2¶1HLOO5 
2014; McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis, & Warneken, 2017; Silk & House, 2012; Warneken & 6 
Tomasello, 2009), but prosocial behavior also changes dramatically between infancy and 7 
adulthood (Hay & Cook, 2007; House et al., 2013). One of the most important developmental 8 
influences on prosocial behavior and its underlying psychology are likely to be socialization 9 
practices and acquired cultural beliefs (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; House, 2016; Kster, 10 
Schuhmacher, & Krtner, 2015), in particular cultural beliefs in the form of learned social norms, 11 
which are behavioral standards shared and enforced by a community (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). 12 
Adults frequently base their costly sharing on culturally-learned and society-specific social 13 
norms (e.g., deciding on the right amount to tip in a restaurant, or to pay in taxes), and norms are 14 
important to many models of human prosociality and social psychological development 15 
(Bicchieri, 2016; Keller, 2013; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010; 16 
Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). Yet, we know little about how children come to model their own 17 
prosocial behavior on information about what is normative, an issue with large implications for 18 
our understanding of the psychology behind prosociality.  19 
Developmental psychologists have clearly documented prosocial behavior in the form of 20 
instrumental and emotional helping in early childhood (Callaghan et al., 2011; Dunfield & 21 
Kuhlmeier, 2013; Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010), but in cases where being prosocial 22 
comes at a personal cost (such as costly sharing) substantial prosociality emerges somewhat 23 
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later. $JRRGPHDVXUHRIFRVWO\VKDULQJLVWKH'LFWDWRU*DPHKHUHDIWHUWKH³'*´LQZKLFKD1 
subject is given an endowment of rewards and allowed to divide that endowment between 2 
themselves and another individual, should they wish to. By age 3-5, children generously give 3 
their own rewards to others in a DG, but both the number of children who give and the total 4 
number of rewards given increases with age (Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Blake & 5 
Rand, 2010; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008). Across different kinds of tasks, the overall 6 
SDWWHUQLQFKLOGUHQ¶VVKDULQJDSSHDUVWREHRQHRILQFUHDVLQJDYHUVLRQWRXQHTXDOLQHTXLWDEOH7 
outcomes between age 3 and 8 (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Fehr et al., 2008; McAuliffe, Blake, 8 
Kim, Wrangham, & Warneken, 2013). Costly sharing and aversion to inequity seems to be 9 
largely similar across societies in early childhood, with societal variation emerging at the 10 
transition to middle childhood around 5-8 years of age (Blake et al., 2015; Cowell et al., 2016; 11 
House, 2016; Rochat et al., 2009), approximating adult-like patterns of behavior by about 11-14 12 
years of age (House et al., 2013).  13 
The psychological foundations of our understanding of norms also develops early, with 14 
children as young as 3 years-old enforcing normative behavior in third-parties (Schmidt & 15 
Rakoczy, 2016) and protesting what adults would consider to be moral violations, such as 16 
harming others and destroying others¶SURSHUW\(Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011; Vaish, 17 
Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). Research on Social Domain Theory shows that by about this same 18 
age children also begin to distinguish between moral and conventional norms. 2-5 year olds 19 
largely agree ZLWKDGXOWVRQZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVD³PRUDO´YLRODWLRn rather than a ³conventional´ 20 
violation (Nucci & Turiel, 1978), and 3-4 year-olds believe that moral violations should be 21 
punished more severely (Smetana, 1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990). 3 year-olds also protest 22 
moral violations equally for members of their own group and members of other groups, while 23 
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protesting conventional violations only for in-group members, suggesting that they (like adults) 1 
expect conventional norms to be more group-specific and variable than moral norms (Schmidt, 2 
Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012).  3 
Young children of this age are also sensitive to descriptive norms based on information 4 
about how common a behavior is, which are generally distinguished from injunctive norms based 5 
RQLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWZKDW³RXJKW´WREHGRQH (moral and conventional norms would generally 6 
fall under this category). Children aged 3-4 years preferentially conform to behaviors that are 7 
common (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Haun & Tomasello, 2011; Haun, van Leeuwen, & Edelson, 8 
2013; Morgan, Laland, & Harris, 2015; Walker & Andrade, 1996), though their facility with 9 
using such information increases substantially between 3 and 7 years of age (Morgan et al., 10 
2015).  11 
How do social norms come to influence costly sharing during childhood? Children may 12 
begin to base their sharing on learned social norms in middle childhood, the age at which adult-13 
like patterns of societal variation in costly sharing begin to emerge (Blake et al., 2015; Cowell et 14 
al., 2016; House et al., 2013; House, 2016). If such societal variation in sharing is caused by 15 
individuals conforming to culturally-unique social norms, then we would expect that children 16 
should begin to model their costly sharing behavior on social norms at the same age that societal 17 
variation in costly sharing emerges (i.e., middle childhood). Note that the claim is not that 18 
children are unaware of norms about costly sharing until middle childhood, only that this may be 19 
the age at which they increasingly act in accordance with what they know they ought to do 20 
(Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). 21 
In a recent study, American children were more generous in a DG when told by the 22 
experimenter that it was normative to give 80% of their rewards to a recipient, and they were less 23 
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generous when told that it was normative to give 20% (McAuliffe, Raihani, & Dunham, 2017). 1 
However, there was no developmental change in how the normative primes influenced sharing 2 
between 4 and 9 years of age, and children were not more influenced by injunctive norms (³,3 
WKLQN\RXVKRXOGJLYHWRWKHRWKHUFKLOG´WKDQE\descriptive norms ³PRVWNLGVWKDWSOD\4 
WKLVJDPHJLYHWRWKHRWKHUFKLOG´DSDWWHUQIRXQGLQDSUHYLRXVVWXG\ZLWKDGXOWV (Raihani 5 
& McAuliffe, 2014). The absence of evidence for either developmental change in norm 6 
sensitivity or a difference between the types of norms could be a consequence of the normative 7 
primes being spoken directly by the experimenter, which could have led children to interpret the 8 
SULPHVWRVRPHGHJUHHDVLQVWUXFWLRQVQRWVLPSO\DVWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VRSLQLRQV or a statement 9 
of facts), rather than norms. This could obscure some of the effects that norms have on sharing. 10 
The present study was conducted prior to the publication of the above study, and takes a 11 
different approach that reduces these methodological concerns while exploring a wider range of 12 
norm primes. We present children with a binary-choice DG, but first prime them with 13 
information about whether it is normative to share more (or less) in this game, and we examine 14 
how this influences FKLOGUHQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRVKDUHEHWween 6 and 11 years of age. The question 15 
of interest is: what is the age at which children who have been primed to share more behave 16 
differently than those who have been primed to share less? This will indicate that age at which 17 
social norms are beginnLQJWRLQIOXHQFHFKLOGUHQ¶Vcostly sharing in this widely-used 18 
experimental task. 19 
Further, we explore how descriptive norms (i.e., what most people do) and injunctive 20 
norms (i.e., what ought to be done) prime costly sharing to different degrees. We also investigate 21 
whether costly sharing is primed differently by two different injunctive norms: (1) a norm stating 22 
what is the right thing to do, and (2) a norm stating what a rule says to do. This approach allows 23 
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XVWRGHVFULEHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFKLOGUHQ¶VWHQdency to model their own costly sharing on what 1 
they have learned to be normative behavior, and for the first time we ask how different kinds of 2 
injunctive norms influence costly sharing to different degrees. 3 
Method 4 
Participants 5 
We tested 238 German-speaking children (126 female) aged 6-11 years (N=101 6.0-8.5 6 
yrs.; N=137 8.5-11.0 yrs.), with four responses from each participant (952 observations). Testing 7 
was conducted in after-school programs in a culturally-homogenous city in eastern Germany, 8 
with only 12.8% of the population being first- or second-generation immigrants (Stadt Leipzig, 9 
2015) in comparison to the national average of 20.8% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015). 31 10 
children were also invited into a laboratory setting for testing. Children were only selected based 11 
on age, no other sampling criteria were included. 12 
Apparatus and Procedure 13 
We employed a binary choice DG, with the subject deciding between two pre-determined 14 
ways of dividing an endowment of rewards between themselves and a Recipient. Numerous 15 
studies have shown the binary-choice DG to be effective with both young children and adults, 16 
with subjects from many different societies, and even with non-human primates, making it an 17 
ideal tool for comparing across diverse populations and a prior studies. 18 
Two laminated paper trays, each with a blue and a green circle, were placed in front of a 19 
seated subject (Figure 1). Each tray corresponded to one of two payoff outcomes that delivered 20 
different quantities of rewards to the Subject and to an anonymous peer Recipient. The 21 
experimenter placed rewards on each of the circles, according to pre-determined payoff 22 
distributionsKHUHDIWHUUHIHUUHGWRDV³UDWLRV´ (Table 1). The Subject selected one of the ratios, 23 
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received the rewards in the blue circle on that tray, and the experimenter would place the rewards 1 
in the green circle in a paper bag that would be given to the Recipient. The experimenter 2 
retrieved all rewards on the unselected tray, and then laid out the payoff distribution for the next 3 
trial. Each experimental session lasted 15 minutes, consisting of four Phases: Familiarization, 4 
Priming, Test, and Interview. Sessions were video recorded. 5 
The ratio choices used in the Familiarization Phase were: ³YV´DQG³YV´ 6 
(ratios are written using the convention: Subject payoff / Recipient payoff). These ratio choices 7 
correspond to tests of Advantageous Inequity and Disadvantageous Inequity (respectively). The 8 
UDWLRFKRLFHVXVHGLQWKH7HVW3KDVHZHUH³YV´ZKLFKis a '*DQG³YV ´ZKLFK9 
we call WKH0D[LPL]LQJ*DPHKHUHDIWHUµ0D[*¶. Whereas the ratios in the DG impose a 10 
conflict of interest for the Subject and Recipient (i.e., the Subject benefits most by 5/1, the 11 
Recipient by 3/3), the ratios in the MaxG do not (i.e., both benefit most by 5/5).  12 
Figure 1 13 
Table 1 14 
Familiarization Phase (hereafter, FAM). Subjects were first given a full set of 15 
instructions (SOM Section 2) and comprehension questions, one trial of each FAM ratio choice 16 
(order counterbalanced across subjects). At all ages nearly all Subjects chose the self-17 
maximizing outcomes in the FAM trials. This indicates that subjects clearly understood the task 18 
and desired the rewards, but the results also thus provide little insight into the development of 19 
childreQ¶Vaversion to inequity in this particular kind of task (SOM Section 4). 20 
Before FAM trials, children were shown the four different kinds of rewards that they 21 
would receive across different trials (Figure 1A): food (gummie bears), stickers, Low-value coins 22 
ZRUWKµ¶ and High-value coins ZRUWKµ¶&RLQVcould be exchanged for prizes at the end of 23 
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the study, but participants did not know the prices for the prizes and so could not strategize to 1 
obtain a target number of coins.  2 
Participants were told that across six trials they would make choices that would deliver 3 
rewards to themselves and to six different peer Recipients, each represented by a different paper 4 
bag (Figure 1B). Children were told that they would never know the identity of the Recipient, 5 
and the recipient would never know their identity. The experimenter then presented the two 6 
FAM trials always using the Low-value Coins, and before choosing a ratio subjects answered 7 
two comprehension questions about the procedure (SOM Section 4):  8 
Comprehension question 1. ³How many rewards would the Subject and Recipient 9 
receive if each tray were chosen?´ 97% and 100% of Subjects answered correctly on the first and 10 
second FAM trials (respectively).  11 
Comprehension question 2. ³:RXOGWKHVXEMHFWUHFHLYHDQ\UHZDUGVLQWKH5HFLSLHQW¶V12 
bag, and dLGWKHVXEMHFWNQRZZKRZRXOGUHFHLYHWKH5HFLSLHQW¶VUHZDUGV"´ 100% of subjects 13 
answered correctly on the first FAM trial.  14 
Priming Phase. Subjects were shown a video on a laptop (Figure 1C) in which an adult 15 
model made a statement (hereafter WKHµSULPH¶SURYLGing information about the two ratios. In the 16 
µ1R-Norm DG (3/3)¶ condition (Table 2) WKHPRGHOVWDWHG³,FDQFKRRVHWKLVRQH>PRGHOSRLQWV17 
to 3/3], or this one [model points to 5/1@´ The prime could influence subjects¶ choices if they 18 
chose whichever ratio the model pointed to first, so in a second treatment we swapped which 19 
ratio was pointed to first: in the µ1R-Norm DG (5/1)¶condition WKHPRGHOVWDWHG³,FDQFKRRVH20 
thiVRQH>SRLQWVWR@RUWKLVRQH>SRLQWVWR@´By comparing across these conditions, we 21 
can test ZKHWKHUFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRUis different ZKHQLVµSULPHG¶i.e., when 3/3 is pointed to 22 
first, in No-Norm DG [3/3]RUZKHQLVµSULPHG¶LH., when 3/3 is pointed to first, in No-23 
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Norm DG [5/1]). Then, we can add additional normative information to the primes (Norm 1 
conditions, see below and Table 2) to ask whether doing so increases WKHSULPHV¶ influence on 2 
VXEMHFWV¶EHKDYLRU  3 
There were three kinds of Norm cRQGLWLRQV,QWKHµRight Norm DG (3/3)¶FRQGLWLRQ the 4 
model stated ³WKHULJKWWKLQJWRFKRRVHLVWKLVRQH>3/3] and not this one [5/1].´ IQWKHµRight 5 
Norm DG (5/1)¶FRQGLWLRQWKHPRGHOVWDWHG³WKHULJKWWKLQJWRFKRose is this one [5/1] and not 6 
WKLVRQH>@´. Again, across these two treatments ZHVZDSZKHWKHULVµSULPHG¶RULV7 
µSULPHG¶EXWQRZ this swap changes whether 3/3 or 5/1 is indicated to be the normative choice. 8 
This was also true across the other Norm conditions. In the µ5Xle Norm DG (3/3)¶condition the 9 
model stated ³WKHUHLVDUXOHWKDWVD\VWRFKRRVHWKLVRQH>3/3] and not this one [5/1]´. In the 10 
µ0DMRULW\Norm DG (3/3)¶FRQGLWLRQthe model stated ³PRVWSHRSOHFKRRVHWKLVRQH>3/3] and not 11 
this one [5/1@´ We also included Rule Norm DG (5/1) and Majority Norm DG (5/1) conditions. 12 
All conditions and treatments were between-subjects. 13 
Finally, we explored whether this normative information influenced behavior only in a 14 
costly sharing context like the DG, or also in the MaxG where there is no conflict of interest 15 
EHWZHHQWKH6XEMHFWDQGWKH5HFLSLHQW,QWKHµRight Norm MaxG (3/3)¶ condition the model 16 
VWDWHG³WKHULJKWWKLQJWRFKRRVHLVWKLVRQH>@ and not this one [5/5@´,QWKHµRight Norm 17 
MaxG (5/5´ condition the model VWDWHG³WKHULJKWWKLQJWRFhoose is this one [5/5] and not this 18 
RQH>@´ 1RWLFHWKDWLQWKHµRight Norm MaxG (3/3)¶FRQGLWLRQWKHPRGHOLVLQGLFDWLQJWKDW19 
choosing 3/3 is normative even though it is a worse outcome for both the Subject and the 20 
Recipient.  21 
Table 2 22 
Test Phase (hereafter TEST). After viewing the priming video, Subjects were presented 23 
with four Test trials (Figure 1D). On each trial Subjects made a binary choice between 3/3 and 24 
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5/1 (DG) or 3/3 and 5/5 (MaxG), with the side of presentation being randomized and each trial 1 
using a different reward (SOM Section 8 analyzes the influence of reward type). The priming 2 
video was only presented once, prior to TEST.  3 
Interview Phase. After the experiment, subjects who were presented with the DG were 4 
asked a fixed-order series of questions probing their beliefs about what another individual would 5 
choose in the same task (another child, an adult, or their teacher), which outcome their teacher 6 
would tell them to choose, and whether the 3/3 and 5/1 outcomeVZHUH³IDLU´RU³ZURQJ´(SOM 7 
Section 9). 8 
Statistical analyses 9 
Data were binary and analyzed using generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with a 10 
binomial link function. All four choices from TEST were included in a single dataset, with a 11 
random effect for Subject ID included in the model. The fixed effect 3/3 PRIMED coded 12 
whether or not 3/3 was the primed ratio, and was used to test whether priming influenced 13 
FKLOGUHQ¶VFKRLFHV Other fixed effects coded for the different conditions (NO-NORM DG, 14 
RIGHT DG, RIGHT MaxG, RULE DG, MAJORITY DG), and these were interacted with 3/3 15 
PRIMED to ask how the effect of priming varied across condition. Covariates controlled for 16 
potentially confounding differences in sex and age distribution across conditions, and also trial 17 
number (SEX, AGE, AGE2, TRIAL#).  18 
There are many advantages of this regression approach. By including all observations 19 
from all conditions in a single analysis with covariates, we increase our statistical power for 20 
analyzing each condition and diminish the possibility that any of the results could be driven by 21 
small samples or confounding variables. Also, because our primary results are based on a single 22 
basic model rather than on different models and repeated statistical tests, the results that we 23 
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report are more likely to be robust ± because they are much less likely to be driven by cherry-1 
picking positive results from models or tests that include different data or combinations of 2 
parameters. 3 
Our a priori hypothesis was that tKHHIIHFWRIEHLQJµSULPHG¶would differ across the 4 
conditions, with the other Norm conditions (RIGHT, RULE, MAJORITY) showing stronger 5 
effects of 3/3 being primed (3/3 PRIMED) than the No-Norm condition. MODEL 1 explores 6 
whether the other Norm conditions show a stronger effect of 3/3 PRIMED than does the No-7 
Norm condition, and whether there are differences in the effect of 3/3 PRIMED across the three 8 
Norm conditions. MODEL 2 expands this to look at how the effect of 3/3 PRIMED develops, by 9 
interacting it with parameters capturing FKLOGUHQ¶VDJHV$*(DQG AGE2. AGE2 allows us to 10 
explore a quadratic (i.e., u-shaped) relationship between age and behavior. MODEL 3 and 11 
MODEL 4 investigate how behavior in the test trials is predicted by FKLOGUHQ¶VUHVSRQVHVWRWKH12 
interview questions. WHIRXQGQRHYLGHQFHWKDW6XEMHFW¶VFKRLFHVLQTEST were predicted by 13 
their SEX, or by their choices in FAM, and do not report those analyses. 14 
For models containing random effects, such of those we use here, the posterior 15 
distribution can be most easily estimated by use of Markov chain Monte Carlo. When a model is 16 
fit with a variant of Markov chain Monte Carlo, generating model predictions (e.g., model 17 
predictions about the behavior of females vs. males) requires processing samples from the 18 
posterior distribution. Each sample of parameter values from the posterior can be plugged into 19 
the model, producing a predicted value for any observable variable. Since the distribution of the 20 
samples approximates the posterior distribution of the parameters, the distribution of predictions 21 
generated from these samples will approximate the target predictive distribution. Computational 22 
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examples of this approach can be found throughout McElreath (2016), and Gelman et al. (2014) 1 
contains an authoritative explanation. 2 
Data were analyzed in the R Environment for Statistical Computing (R Development 3 
Core Team, 2015). We used a variant of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC), an algorithm 4 
particular good with high dimension models, as implemented in RStan (Stan Development Team, 5 
2015). For discussion of HMC's advantages, see Chapter 12 of Gelman et al. (2014). Models 6 
were specified using map2stan (McElreath, 2016), a convenience package for RStan. The model 7 
was specified using weakly informative priors, which reduce overfitting and also help the 8 
Markov chain to converge to the posterior distribution more effectively than flat priors. See 9 
Section 2.9 of Gelman et al. (2014) for an introduction, as well as computational examples in 10 
Chapter 8 of McElreath (2016).  The posterior distribution we present here is based on 5000 11 
samples from three chains (after 1000 adaptation steps). These samples were sufficient to 12 
establish convergence to the target posterior distribution. Running the chains longer produces no 13 
change in inference. We assessed convergence through the R-hat Gelman and Rubin statistic. All 14 
R-hat values were less than 1.01 (R-hat values greater than 1.01 can indicate that the chain did 15 
not converge), and the effective number of samples for all parameters exceeded 1695 (effective 16 
numbers of samples much smaller than the actual number of samples can suggest that the chain 17 
was not efficient). Readers unfamiliar with diagnosing chain convergence should see Chapter 8 18 
of McElreath (2016) for an introduction and Sections 11.4 and 11.5 of Gelman et al. (2014) for 19 
an authoritative treatment. 20 
Results 21 
Prosocial choices in TEST 22 
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Table 3 displays the results of MODEL 1, which investigates the effect of 3/3 PRIMED, 1 
using the No Norm DG condition as the reference level (i.e., the Intercept; see SOM Section 3 2 
for model structure). As predicted, there was no substantial effect of 3/3 PRIMED in the No 3 
Norm DG condition (i.e., children chose 3/3 similarly often whether 3/3 was indicated first or 4 
second; Row 6). 3/3 PRIMED had a reliably stronger effect in the Right Norm DG condition 5 
(Row 7), and showed a similar pattern in the Right Norm MaxG condition (Row 8), though this 6 
effect did not reach the criterion for reliability (i.e., the 95% CIs include zero). In contrast to the 7 
Right Norm DG condition, the Majority Norm DG and Rule Norm DG conditions did not show a 8 
reliably stronger effect of 3/3 PRIMED than did the No Norm condition (Rows 9-10). This 9 
suggests that SULPLQJRULQIOXHQFHGFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRULQWKH5LJKW1RUP'*FRQGLWLRQ10 
(and perhaps in the Right Norm MaxG condition), but not in the other conditions.  11 
Table 3 12 
A related question is whether children are overall more likely to choose 3/3 in the other 13 
Norm DG conditions than in the No Norm DG conditions. Figure 2 compares 02'(/¶V14 
estimate of the probability of a 3/3 choice in the No Norm DG, Right Norm DG, Rule Norm DG, 15 
and Majority Norm DG conditions. Lines indicate WKHPRGHO¶VHVWLPDWHGSUREDELOLW\RID16 
choice and shaded regions indicate the 95% CI for these estimates (i.e., the shaded region within 17 
which the true value of each parameter estimate is likely to lie at the 95% confidence level). We 18 
plot these estimates separately for when 3/3 was the primed ratio (Figure 2, left), and for when 19 
5/1 was the primed figure (Figure 2, right). Where the line (i.e., the estimate) for one condition 20 
lies above and outside the 95% CIs of the line for a second condition, we infer that children 21 
chose the 3/3 ratio more often in the first condition than in the second. Note that these are 95% 22 
CIs and not standard errors, so model estimates are assumed to be different even if the CIs 23 
overlap, so long as the CIs do not overlap the other lines. 24 
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When 3/3 was the primed ratio (Figure 2, left), the estimated probability of a 3/3 choice is 1 
greater in the Right Norm DG condition than in the No Norm DG condition. In contrast, the 2 
probability of a 3/3 choice in the Rule Norm DG and Majority Norm DG is not greater than in 3 
the No Norm DG condition. When 5/1 was the primed ratio (Figure 2, right), the probability of a 4 
3/3 choice was similar across all four DG conditions. This indicates that children were more 5 
likely to choose 3/3 in the Right Norm condition than in the No Norm condition, but only when 6 
3/3 had been primed. 7 
Figure 2 8 
MODEL 2 explores how the effect of 3/3 PRIMED develops (SOM Section 3 for model 9 
details), and Figure 3 displays model results for all four DG conditions. Solid red lines represent 10 
WKHPRGHO¶VHVWLPDWHVRIWKHSUREDELOLW\WKDW6XEMHFWVZLOOPDNHDFKRLFHZKHQZDVWKH11 
primed ratio, and closed red dots are the raw data (the mean number of 3/3 choices made by each 12 
subject across the four test trials). Dashed blue lines and open blue dots represent the PRGHO¶V13 
estimates, and the raw data, when 5/1 was the primed ratio are the raw data. 14 
 A robust effect of 3/3 PRIMED develops in the Right Norm DG condition after about 15 
7.5 years of age. There is perhaps also a small effect of 3/3 PRIMED in the Majority Norm DG 16 
condition after about 9.5 years of age, and the weakness of this effect appears to be due to 17 
substantial variability in the probability of 3/3 choices when 5/1 was primed, revealed by the 18 
wide CI. This variability is likely caused by large differences in how children respond to the 19 
primes across the four types of rewards (see SOM Section 8).  20 
A separate control condition demonstrated that 7 year-olds attend to and learn from the 21 
videos, by showing that children of this age successfully reported the information presented in 22 
the videos (SOM Section 7). 23 
Figure 3 24 
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Figure 4 displays the results of Model 2 for both the Right DG and the Right MaxG 1 
conditions. Just as in the Right DG condition, an effect of 3/3 primed develops in the Right 2 
MaxG condition, but perhaps a bit later in childhood after about 9.5 years of age (see SOM 3 
Section 6 for analysis of potential age differences). 4 
Figure 4 5 
Interview responses predict choices in TEST 6 
MODEL 3 (Table 4) shows that children were more likely to choose 3/3 if they believed 7 
that choosing 5/1 (the self-maximizing outcome) was wrong (Row 5) or that choosing 5/1 was 8 
unfair (Row 6). However, children were not as reliably influenced by their beliefs about whether 9 
3/3 (the more prosocial outcome) was fair or wrong (Rows 7-8). MODEL 4 (Table 5) shows that 10 
children were also more likely to choose 3/3 when they believed that their teacher would tell 11 
them to choose that one (Row 7). However, children were not as reliably influenced by whether 12 
they believed another child or their teacher would choose 3/3 themselves (Rows 5-6). See SOM 13 
Section 9 for further analysis of how these effects develop. Additional analyses did not find 14 
HYLGHQFHWKDWVXEMHFWV¶MXGJPHQWVRIZKHWKHUDQGZHUHZURQJRUIDLUUHOLDEO\SUHGLFWHG15 
the effect of 3/3 PRIMED in TEST.  16 
Table 4 17 
Table 5 18 
 19 
Discussion 20 
We found that by 7.5-9 years of age children had begun to clearly model their own costly 21 
sharing on what an adult said was the normative way to share, and that this tendency increased 22 
between 6 and 11 years of age. Note that our results do not necessarily preclude social norms 23 
from influencing costly sharing at younger ages, an effect that could be better resolved using 24 
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methods with larger sample sizes, smaller costs associated with sharing, and stronger norm 1 
primes ± but nonetheless we expect that such methods would also show an increasing influence 2 
of norms on sharing during middle childhood. 3 
This primary finding fits our prediction that social norms would begin to strongly shape 4 
costly sharing in middle childhood, but, interestingly, there were larger differences than expected 5 
in how the different kinds of norms influenced cKLOGUHQ¶Vchoices. The stronger influence of 6 
Right Norms relative to Majority Norms is the first demonstration of an asymmetry in the 7 
influence of injunctive and descriptive norms in children¶s sharing, and is consistent with a prior 8 
finding WKDWLQMXQFWLYHQRUPVDUHPRUHLQIOXHQWLDOWKDQGHVFULSWLYHQRUPVRQDGXOWV¶EHKDYLRUin a 9 
DG (Raihani & McAuliffe, 2014). However, there is also evidence that descriptive norms can be 10 
more influential than injunctive norms on DGXOWV¶DG behavior (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009), 11 
suggesting that whether injunctive or descriptive norms are more influential depends greatly on 12 
the specific details of the context and the norm primes.  13 
This could be why the results of the present study differ from those of a prior study that 14 
found injunctive and descriptive norms to be equally influential on DG choices by 4-9 year-old 15 
children (McAuliffe, Raihani, et al., 2017). In that study the experimenter directly spoke the 16 
primes to the subjects, which we speculate could have led subjects to think of the primes as 17 
instructions rather than norms. The present study may have better preserved the perceived 18 
normative content of the primes by presenting the them through videos of unfamiliar third-19 
parties who do not directly indicate to the subjects what they should do.  20 
Another way in that the framing and content of the primes may matter has to do with the 21 
uniformity of the descriptive norm. For example, the phrase ³HYHU\RQHFKRRVHV´ZRXOGOLNHO\ 22 
be more influential than the phrase ³PRVWSHRSOHFKRRVH´. Indeed, prior work shows that 23 
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children as young as age 3 are predominantly influenced by unanimous behavior by others, while 1 
older children are increasingly influenced by smaller pluralities (Morgan et al., 2015). Also, 2 
learning that peers, parents, or prestigious/knowledgeable people made a choice could be more 3 
influential than learning about an anonymous average other person (Chudek, Heller, Birch, & 4 
Henrich, 2012; Kline, Boyd, & Henrich, 2013).  5 
Content effects may also account for our finding that the Right Norm was more 6 
influential than the Rule Norm. Despite the fact that both are kinds of injunctive norms, it is 7 
possible that they fall at different points on the Moral/Conventional distinction. Researchers 8 
studying Social Domain Theory have done much work to describe FKLOGUHQ¶VXQGHUstanding of 9 
moral and conventional norms, particularly transgressions of these norms. Moral norms and 10 
transgressions relate to rights and welfare (for example, personal loss or injury); while 11 
conventional norms and transgressions relate to rules and regulations that structure social 12 
interactions and organizations (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana & Braeges, 1990). This literature 13 
fiQGVWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPRUDODQGFRQYHQWLRQDOnorms develop differently, and 14 
that by 3.\HDUVRIDJHFKLOGUHQ³judge[d] moral transgressions to be more independent of rules 15 
and authority, more generalizably wrong, and more serious than conventional transgressions." 16 
(Smetana & Braeges, 1990, p. 341).  17 
This suggests that by 3-4 years of age children distinguish moral and conventional norms, 18 
and that they will likely perceive greater pressure to conform their costly sharing to moral norms, 19 
even though they might judge transgressions of both moral and conventional norms to be 20 
negative. Based on the above definitions, our Right Norm and Rule Norm primes would be 21 
relatively better categorized as moral and conventional (respectively), providing a plausible 22 
account of why the Right Norm had a more reliable influence on costly sharing than did the Rule 23 
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Norm. However, there are other dimensions of the moral/conventional distinction that are not 1 
specifically referenced by our primes (e.g., generalizability/context dependence, authority 2 
dependence, harm), and future studies could use our methods to explore these other dimensions 3 
to elaborate further how our primes and results relate to the literature on the moral/conventional 4 
distinction. For example, the Right Norm prime did not directly reference justice, welfare, or 5 
harm (though consequences cashed out in these terms may be implied by the phrase µWKLVLVthe 6 
right WKLQJWRGR¶). Future studies using primes that directly reference justice, welfare, and harm 7 
will more clearly situate the norm in the moral domain (reviewer suggestion). With a similar 8 
approach future studies will also be able to nail down exactly how, and how much, injunctive 9 
and descriptive norms influence behavior.   10 
Importantly, social norms are not exclusively relevant for sharing, which is consistent 11 
with our finding that Right Norms motivated both costly sharing and behavior that created worse 12 
outcomes for everyone (i.e., selecting 3/3 over 5/5 in the MaxG). This illustrates the flexibility 13 
and power of social norms, which can motivate many behaviors that are either positive or 14 
negative (or even irrational). The lesson is that even though our findings reveal the emerging 15 
influence of social norms on sharing in middle childhood, this is likely just one part of a broader 16 
developmental trend towards children conforming to social norms across many domains of 17 
behavior as they approach adolescence and adulthood.   18 
Interestingly, prior studies have shown that middle childhood is also the age at which 19 
societal variation in costly sharing first emerges (Cowell et al., 2016; House et al., 2013; Rochat 20 
et al., 2009). Our results support the idea that societally-varying forms of costly sharing appear in 21 
middle childhood at least in part due to children beginning to conform more strongly to local 22 
norms about prosocial behavior. An additional point of empirical support comes from another 23 
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recent study, which found that with increasing age 4-9 year-old American children became more 1 
likely to give exactly 50% in a DG, even though the experimenter presented them with norm 2 
primes indicating that they should give either 80% or 20% (McAuliffe, Raihani, et al., 2017). 3 
This suggests that during middle childhood American children may be increasingly applying an 4 
LQWHUQDOL]HG³HTXDOVSOLW´ norm in costly sharing situations. Importantly, this bias toward 50% 5 
splits may be culturally variable, as watching a model give 90% in a DG motivated majorities of 6 
Indian children aged 5-8 to give more than 50% of their endowment, but motivated very few 7 
American children to do so (Blake, Corbit, Callaghan, & Warneken, 2016).  8 
Finally, based on our interview we found that children who judged the self-maximizing 9 
ratio (5/1) to be wrong and unfair were also more likely to have chosen the more-prosocial ratio 10 
(3/3) in TEST, but we observed no such influence of judgments about the prosocial ratio (3/3). 11 
This may mean that the relevant content of German chiOGUHQ¶VVRFLDOQRUPVcenters on avoiding 12 
negative sanctions for being selfish. Furthermore, children who judged that their teacher would 13 
tell them to choose the more-prosocial ratio were also more likely to have chosen that ratio in 14 
TEST, but there was no LQIOXHQFHRIFKLOGUHQ¶VMXGJPHQWVDERXWWKHOLNHO\actual behavior of 15 
other children and adults. German children may thus be more motivated by what they believed 16 
was expected of them than by what they believe others actually do, consistent with our finding 17 
that injunctive norms were more reliably influential on sharing than were descriptive norms. 18 
These findings are consistent with a wide range of evidence showing that a desire to avoid 19 
punishment for selfishness is an important motivator (though by no means the only motivator) of 20 
prosocial behavior in children and adults (Lergetporer, Angerer, Gltzle-Rtzler, & Sutter, 2014; 21 
Mathew & Boyd, 2011; McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015). 22 
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What aspects of psychological development cause these age-related changes in behavior? 1 
Humans may have an evolved norm psychology that facilitates social coordination and accurate 2 
cultural transmission through cognitive mechanisms that help individuals to follow local social 3 
norms (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013), information that varies greatly 4 
across societies (Graham et al., 2011; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), and which children 5 
must follow if they are to be successful members of their cultural communities. The development 6 
of costly sharing may thus be linked to the ontogenesis of human norm psychology.  7 
However, many different aspects of psychological development are likely at work. 8 
Increasing inhibitory control during middle childhood could enable children to better adjudicate 9 
conflicts between their immediate desires and their understanding of what constitutes normative 10 
behavior, and there is evidence for age-UHODWHGLQFUHDVHVLQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQKLELtory control in 11 
binary-choice sharing tasks such as those used here (Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 1997). 12 
6LPLODUO\LQFUHDVLQJFRPSHWHQFHZLWKUHSUHVHQWLQJRWKHUV¶PHQWDOVWDWHVGXULQJPLGGOH13 
FKLOGKRRGPD\IDFLOLWDWHFKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRXQGHUVWDQGZKDWRWhers expect them to do, and the 14 
elaboration of the self-conscious emotions (e.g., guilt and shame) in middle childhood may be 15 
important for motivating conformity to social norms (House, 2018). 16 
These and other plausible developmental phenomena (e.g., improved lingustic skills, 17 
changing social relationships as with peers and adults, etc.) likely do play a role in the 18 
development of normative influences on costly sharing. However, they do not necessarily 19 
contradict the norm psychology perspective, which primarily argues that human psychology and 20 
its development have likely evolved such that one of the many functions of our domain-specific 21 
and domain-general cognitive mechanisms is to help us follow adaptive local social norms. 22 
Summary 23 
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Here, we have shown that children become increasingly likely to conform to social norms 1 
about sharing in middle childhood, but that different kinds of norms influence children¶Vcostly 2 
sharing to different degrees. The results hint that the growing influence of norms on sharing is 3 
part of a wider expansion of the influence of norms on behavior in middle childhood, and future 4 
studies will be able to use these methods to further elaborate how different kinds of norms shape 5 
costly sharing and prosocial psychology across development. 6 
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Figure 1 3 
Apparatus and procedure used in the current study. (A) Children are shown the four kinds 4 
of rewards that they can receive in the study. (B) They are shown six different bags, and 5 
told that for each of the six choices that they make the rewards sent to the Recipient will be 6 
put into a different bag, and each bag will be given to a different child. (C) Children are 7 
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Table 1 1 
Payoff distributions (i.e., ratios) used in the current study. 2 
 3 





FAM Advantageous Inequity Game (AIG) 2/1 4/1 
FAM Disadvantageous Inequity Game (DIG) 1/2 2/6 
TEST Dictator Game (DG) 3/3 5/1 
TEST Maximizing Game (MaxG) 3/3 5/5 
 4 
  5 
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Table 2 1 
Experimental conditions. Each row is a between-subjects sample (N=23 or 24). 2 
 3 













5 for Subject  
1 for Recipient 
No Norm 
DG 
(3/3) ǲȋ ?Ȁ ?Ȍǡȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǤǳ 




ǲȋ ?Ȁ ?Ȍǡ ȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǤǳ 
(5/1) 




ǲThere is a rule that says to choose (3/3),  ȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǤǳ 
(5/1) 




ǲȋ ?Ȁ ?Ȍǡ ȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǤǳ 
(5/1) 
ǲȋ ?Ȁ ?Ȍǡ ȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǤǳ 






ǲȋ ?Ȁ ?Ȍǡ ȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǤǳ 
(5/1) 
ǲȋ ?Ȁ ?Ȍǡ ȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǤǳ 
 4 
 5 
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Table 3 1 
Results of MODEL 1. 3/3 35,0('FDSWXUHVZKHWKHUZDVWKHµSULPHG¶UDWLR2 
35,0(' RUZDVWKHµSULPHG¶UDWLR35,0(' 5RZJLYHVWKHJLYHVWKH3 
effect of 3/3 PRIMED for the No Norm condition. Rows 7-10 use interactions to ask 4 
whether the effect of 3/3 PRIMED is stronger in each of the Norm conditions, relative to 5 
the No Norm condition. N=238.  6 
 7 








1 Intercept (No Norm condition) -0.99 -1.95 -0.02  0.49 
2 RIGHT NORM DG (Dummy) -0.43 -1.42 0.58  0.51 
3 RIGHT NORM MaxG (Dummy) -1.08 -2.12 -0.06  0.52 
4 MAJORITY NORM DG (Dummy) -0.09 -1.08 0.92  0.51 
5 RULE NORM DG (Dummy) 0.07 -0.93 1.03  0.50 
6 3/3 PRIMED (No Norm condition) 0.35 -0.47 1.20 1.42 0.43 
7 3/3 PRIMED * Right Norm DG condition 1.38 0.15 2.65 3.97 0.64 
8 3/3 PRIMED * Right Norm MaxG condition 0.81 -0.44 2.11 2.24 0.65 
9 3/3 PRIMED * Majority Norm DG condition 0.02 -1.25 1.26 1.02 0.64 
10 3/3 PRIMED * Rule Norm DG condition 0.40 -0.85 1.66 1.50 0.64 
11 SEX 0.23 -0.41 0.87  0.33 
12 TRIAL# -0.21 -0.36 -0.05  0.08 
13 AGE 1.17 0.81 1.53  0.18 
14 AGE2 0.17 -0.22 0.56  0.20 
15 Random Intercept (Subject ID) 1.96 1.55 2.41  0.22 
 8 
  9 
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Figure 2 1 
Probability of 3/3 choices by the Subject in TEST, in the Norm DG conditions: Right Norm 2 
DG, Majority Norm DG, Rule Norm DG, No Norm DG. Model estimates are plotted as 3 
lines, with shaded regions representing 95% confidence intervals. Results are plotted 4 
separately for when 3/3 was the primed ratio (left graph) and when 5/1 was the primed 5 
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Figure 3 1 
Probability of 3/3 choices by the Subject in TEST, in the Norm DG conditions: Right Norm 2 
DG, Majority Norm DG, Rule Norm DG, No Norm DG. Model estimates are plotted as 3 
lines, with shaded regions representing 95% confidence intervals. Dots represent raw data, 4 
the average numbers of 3/3 choices for a single subject (a dot at y=.5 indicates a subject 5 
chose 3/3 on 50% of trials). Results are plotted separately for when 3/3 was the primed 6 
ratio (red solid lines and closed dots) and when 5/1 was the primed ratio (blue dashed lines 7 
and open circles). All graphs, n=238. 8 
 9 
 10 
  11 
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Figure 4 1 
Probability of 3/3 choices by the Subject in TEST, in the Right Norm DG and Right Norm 2 
MaxG conditions. Model estimates are plotted as lines, with shaded regions representing 3 
95% confidence intervals. Dots represent raw data, the average numbers of 3/3 choices for 4 
a single subject (a dot at y=.5 indicates a subject chose 3/3 on 50% of trials). Results are 5 
plotted separately for when 3/3 was the primed ratio (red solid lines and closed dots) and 6 
when 5/1 was the primed ratio (blue dashed lines and open circles). All graphs, n=238. 7 
 8 
 9 
  10 
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Table 4 1 
Results for MODEL 3. 3/3 PRIMED (Row 4) controls for the overall effect of whether 3/3 2 
or 5/1 was primed. Rows 5-DVNZKHWKHU6XEMHFWV¶MXGJPHQWVDERXWZKHWKHUDQG3 
ZHUH³ZURQJ´RU³IDLU´SUHGLFWWKHLUFKRLFHVRILQ7(67³\HV´UHVSRQVHVFRGHGDV ³´4 
N=160 children who answered the interview questions. 5 
 6 








1 Intercept -0.73 -2.05 0.45  0.64 
2 Sex 0.26 -0.43 0.94  0.35 
3 Trial Number -0.24 -0.43 -0.07  0.09 
4 3/3 PRIMED 0.90 0.21 1.59  0.35 
5 5/1 was Wrong 1.54 0.69 2.40 4.66 0.43 
6 5/1 was Fair -1.02 -1.95 -0.03 0.36 0.49 
7 3/3 was Wrong -0.86 -1.93 0.19 0.42 0.54 
8 3/3 was Fair -0.17 -1.24 0.98 0.84 0.57 
9 Random Intercept (Subject ID) 1.73 1.26 2.20  0.24 
 7 
 8 
  9 
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 Table 5  1 
Results for MODEL 4. 3/3 PRIMED (Row 4) controls for the overall effect of whether 3/3 2 
or 5/1 was primed. Rows 5-DVNZKHWKHU6XEMHFWV¶MXGJPHQWVDERXWZKHWKHURWKHUVZRXOG3 
FKRRVH³´RU³´RUZKHWKHUWKHLUWHDFKHUZRXOGWell them to choose 3/3 or 5/1) predict 4 
WKHLUFKRLFHVRILQ7(67UHVSRQVHVRI³´DUHFRGHGDV³´1 FKLOGUHQZKR5 
answered the interview questions. 6 
 7 








1 Intercept -2.02 -3.19 -0.91  0.59 
2 Sex 0.30 -0.47 1.03  0.38 
3 Trial Number -0.29 -0.48 -0.09  0.10 
4 3/3 PRIMED 0.70 -0.03 1.46  0.38 
5 Which would other child choose 0.80 -0.15 1.73 2.23 0.48 
6 Which would teacher choose 0.60 -0.30 1.53 1.82 0.47 
7 
Which would teacher tell  
Subject to choose 1.06 0.09 2.01 2.89 0.49 
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SOM Section 1: Details about Participants and Apparatus 
Participants were 238 German-speaking children aged 6-11 years (see Figure 3 for 
age distributions).  Note that all of these subjects are combined into one dataset, so 
all of these subjects are contributing to all of the analyses (i.e., if one age sample 
seems small, this is not the only data that is contributing to the inferences).  
Figure 3: Age Distributions for the different samples. 
 
 
Testing was mostly conducted in after-school programs located within schools in a 
city in eastern Germany. 31 children were invited into a laboratory for testing, and 
these children were about equally distributed across the Right Norm DG (7), Rule 
Norm DG (7), Majority Norm DG (8), and No Norm DG (9) conditions. Each 
experimental session lasted 15 minutes, and consisted of four Phases: 
Familiarization, Priming, Test, and Interview. Sessions were video recorded. The 
apparatus consisted of two large laminated paper trays, each with a blue and green 








































































































































































Figure 4: Apparatus and procedure used in the current study. 
 
 
The experimenter placed rewards on each of the circles, according to pre-
determined payoff distributions (Table 7). The Actor was then permitted to select 
one tray. The Actor would then receive the rewards in the blue circle on that tray, 
and the experimenter placed the rewards in the green circle in a paper bag that 
would be given to the Recipient. All rewards on the unselected tray were then 
retrieved by the experimenter and returned to reservoir of rewards, and the 
experimenter then laid out the payoff distribution for the next trial. 
 
Table 7: Payoff distributions used in the current study. 
Payoff # Phase Payoff Choice Outcome 1 Outcome 2 
1 Familiarization Advantageous Inequity Game 2/1 4/1 
2 Familiarization Disadvantageous Inequity Game 1/2 2/6 
3 Test Dictator Game 3/3 5/1 




SOM Section 2: English Translation of Study Script 
 
Introduction (prior to entering testing area; instructions provided by 
Experimenter 2) 
Hello! We brought you some things. You can participate [in the activity]. ǯǡǡǤ
something from the little shop I brought with me today.  
Do you want to see it [the shop]? ȏ ?ǲǳȐ 
The yellow coins are worth 1 point and the red coins are worth 2 points. So the red 
coins are worth twice as much as the yellow ones. You can use them to buy 
something from here. The small things cost less and the big things cost more. 
[Child enters room where E1 is waiting] 
Introduction (after entering testing area; instructions provided by 
Experimenter 1) 
Hi! Thanks for participating! 
[Experimenter 2] already explained that you can get coins that you can use to buy 
something from the shop. The red ones are worth twice as much as the yellow ones.  
[E1 shows some red and yellow coins to the child] 
You can also have these glow-in-the-dark stars to take home with you.  
[E1 shows some glow-in-the-dark stars to the child] 
And you can have gummy bears, too.  
[E1 shows some gummy bears to the child] 
[Experimenter takes one of the bags and places it opposite the child] 
Here is your bag. You can write your name on it.  
You can put everything you get into the bag. 
 5 
You can choose six times. Each time you choose, you will get something, and another 
child at your school [or: another child in Leipzig; for the minority of children tested 
in the laboratory] will get something, too.  
[Experimenter brings out six bags] 
Six other children at this school /(in Leipzig) will get one of these bags. Right now, I ǯǡǤǯǤǯǡsome 




Instructions Ȃ Familiarization Trial 1 
First, let me tell you how this is all going to work. 
[Experimenter lays out coins] 
In just a minute, you can choose between these two papers. You can choose 
whichever one you want. 
 [pointing to the first paper] 
If you choose this paper, you get everything in the blue circle, and everything in the 
green circle goes into the bag. 
 [pointing to the second paper] 
If you choose this paper, you get everything in the blue circle, and everything in the 
green circle goes into the bag. 
Comprehension questions Ȃ Familiarization Trial 1 
Can you tell me how it works? 
(If child fails to explain, repeat explanation) 
How many things do you get if you choose this paper? 
[pointing to the first paper] 
 6 
How many things do you get if you choose this paper? 
[pointing to the second paper] 
How many things does the other child get if you pick this paper? 
[pointing to the first paper] 
And how many things does the other child get if you pick this paper? 
[pointing to the second paper] 
 
[If child answers a question incorrectly, experimenter repeats: If you choose this 
paper, you get everything in the blue circle, and everything in the green circle goes 
into the bag for the other child.] 
 [poǯȐ 
After you choose, do you get this bag, or not? 
Who gets the bag? (If necessary: Will another child from your school / (in Leipzig) 
get it?)  
Will the child who gets the bag know that you gave them the things? 
[If child answers a question incorrectly, experimenter repeats: Each bag goes to a ȀȋȌǡǤǯǤǯǤȐ 
Instructions Ȃ Familiarization Trial 2 	ǡǯȀȋȌǯǤ 
You can choose whichever paper you want, just like last time. But remember, you 
can only choose one.  
Comprehension questions Ȃ Familiarization Trial 2 
 [pointing to the first paper] 
How many things do you get if you choose this paper? 
 7 
How many things go into the bag for the other child? 
[If child answers a question incorrectly, experimenter repeats: If you choose this 
paper, you get everything in the blue circle, and everything in the green circle goes 
into the bag.] 
 [pointing to the second paper] 
How many things do you get if you choose this paper? 
How many things go into the other bag for the other child? 
 [If child answers a question incorrectly, experimenter repeats: If you choose this 
paper, you get everything in the blue circle, and everything in the green circle goes 
into the bag.] 
 ȏǯȐ 
Does the same child who got the bag from the last choice get this bag too, or does a 
different child get this bag? 




Instructions Ȃ Test Trials 
For the next choice, we have a different bag that will go to a different child. ǡǯǤǡso you will 
use headphonesǤǡǯǤ 
 
[Video shows an experimenter laying out the rewards in front of an Adult (the Adult 
Model), sitting in the same position that the child Subject is currently sitting in.]  
The experimenter in the video then says: ǲǡǤǳ 
 8 
 
The Adult Model then utters the priming statement for that Condition: 
 
Right Norm DG / MaxG conditions:  The right thing to do is to choose this 
one, and not this one. 
Majority Norm DG condition: Most people choose this one, and not 
this one. 
Rule Norm DG condition:   The rules say to choose this one, and 
not this one. 
No Norm DG condition:     I can choose this one or this one. 
Frog Control condition (SOM Section 7):    I can choose this one or this one, [The 
Adult Model picks up a toy Frog sitting 
on the table] and I must put the Frog on 




(Interview is conducted after the last Test Trial.) ǯore coins on the table, as an example, because I want to ask 
you a few more questions. 
[experimenter lays out payoffs corresponding to those used in the Test Trials] 
1) Soon, another child will come and play the same game. He or she will sit here ǯ sitting and get everything in the blue circle. And a different 
child will get everything in the green circle. 
2) Which paper do you think the next child will choose? Why?  
 
[Pointing to the option that subject said the other child would choose] 
3) Would it be wrong to choose this one? Why? 
 
 9 
[Pointing to the other option, which subject said the other child would NOT 
choose] 
4) Would it be wrong to choose that one? Why? 
 
[Pointing to the option that subject said the other child would choose] 
5) Would it be fair to choose this one? Why? 
 
[Pointing to the option that subject said the other child would NOT choose] 
6) Would it be fair to choose this one? Why? 
 
7) If there were a grown-up sitting here instead of you, which do you think he 
would pick? Why? 
8) Do you have a male teacher or female teacher? [This question is only 
included to ensure that the following questions use the appropriately-
ǲǳȋȀȌȐ 
9) If your teacher were sitting here instead of you, which do you think he / she 
would pick? Why?  
10) Which paper would your teacher tell you to pick? 
  
 10 
SOM Section 3: Details about Models 
Model 1 Formula:  
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ 1 + (1 |Subject_ID) + Sex + Trial_Number + Age + Age_Squared +  
33PRIMED * (RIGHT_NORM_DG + RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ MAJORITY_NORM_DG + RULE_NORM_DG)  
Model.1 <- map2stan(alist( 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_33PRIMED + b_SEX*SEX + 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER*TRIAL_NUMBER + b_AGE*AGE + b_AGE_SQUARED*AGE_SQUARED + 
b_33PRIMED*33PRIMED + b_RIGHT_NORM_DG*RIGHT_NORM_DG + 





b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG*33PRIMED*RULE_NORM_DG + v_Intercept[Subject_ID], 
 
Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED ~ dnorm(0,1), b_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_RULE_NORM_DG ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG ~ 













Intercept -0.99 0.49 -1.95 -0.02 7369.28 1.00 
b_SEX 0.23 0.33 -0.41 0.87 6528.73 1.00 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER -0.21 0.08 -0.36 -0.05 12379.83 1.00 
b_AGE 1.17 0.18 0.81 1.53 4747.42 1.00 
b_AGE_SQUARED 0.17 0.20 -0.22 0.56 7022.62 1.00 
b_33PRIMED 0.35 0.43 -0.47 1.20 5577.13 1.00 
b_RIGHT_NORM_DG -0.43 0.51 -1.42 0.58 7365.96 1.00 
b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG -1.08 0.52 -2.12 -0.06 8259.83 1.00 
b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG -0.09 0.51 -1.08 0.92 7445.47 1.00 
b_RULE_NORM_DG 0.07 0.50 -0.93 1.03 5943.90 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG 1.38 0.64 0.15 2.65 7109.55 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG 0.81 0.65 -0.44 2.11 8222.59 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG 0.02 0.64 -1.25 1.26 7171.60 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG 0.40 0.64 -0.85 1.66 7055.27 1.00 
sigma_Subject_ID 1.96 0.22 1.55 2.41 1920.59 1.00 
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Model 2 Formula:  
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ 1 + (1 |aid) + Sex + Trial_Number + Age*33PRIMED*(RIGHT_NORM_DG + 
RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ MAJORITY_NORM_DG + RULE_NORM_DG) + 
Age_Squared*33PRIMED*(RIGHT_NORM_DG + RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ MAJORITY_NORM_DG + 
RULE_NORM_DG) 
 
Model.2 <- map2stan( alist(  
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER*TRIAL_NUMBER + b_AGE*AGE + b_33PRIMED*33PRIMED + 
b_RIGHT_NORM_DG*RIGHT_NORM_DG + b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG*RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ 
b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG*MAJORITY_NORM_DG + b_RULE_NORM_DG*RULE_NORM_DG + 


























Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED ~ dnorm(0,1), b_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_RULE_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_SQUARED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_33PRIMED ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_RULE_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_RIGHT_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_RULE_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG 
~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
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b_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), v_Intercept[Subject_ID] ~ 
dnorm(0,sigma_Subject_ID), sigma_Subject_ID ~ dcauchy(0,2))) 
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Model 2 Output: 
Model Parameter Mean StdDev lower 0.95 upper 0.95 n_eff Rhat 
Intercept -1.00 0.53 -2.04 0.03 10252.96 1.00 
b_SEX 0.29 0.35 -0.39 1.00 11111.55 1.00 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER -0.21 0.08 -0.37 -0.05 15000.00 1.00 
b_AGE 0.85 0.37 0.11 1.56 7288.95 1.00 
b_33PRIMED 0.53 0.52 -0.50 1.54 9837.57 1.00 
b_RIGHT_NORM_DG -0.45 0.61 -1.68 0.72 11680.03 1.00 
b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG -0.82 0.62 -2.04 0.38 11600.35 1.00 
b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG -0.11 0.60 -1.24 1.11 12169.43 1.00 
b_RULE_NORM_DG -0.19 0.59 -1.34 0.97 11011.17 1.00 
b_AGE_SQUARED 0.14 0.37 -0.56 0.89 9197.20 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED 0.47 0.47 -0.45 1.38 9600.97 1.00 
b_AGE_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG 0.11 0.55 -0.99 1.18 10052.70 1.00 
b_AGE_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG 0.24 0.59 -0.86 1.45 11898.19 1.00 
b_AGE_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG 0.51 0.53 -0.52 1.56 9755.50 1.00 
b_AGE_X_RULE_NORM_DG 0.25 0.56 -0.87 1.34 10242.00 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG 1.52 0.73 0.08 2.94 12875.77 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG 0.72 0.74 -0.74 2.16 13376.60 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG 0.25 0.73 -1.19 1.66 12737.75 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG -0.11 0.72 -1.54 1.24 15000.00 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_AGE_SQUARED -0.30 0.47 -1.22 0.62 10173.80 1.00 
b_RIGHT_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED 0.11 0.58 -1.00 1.25 11231.92 1.00 
b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG_X_AGE_SQUARED -0.50 0.62 -1.70 0.72 12460.28 1.00 
b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED 0.07 0.52 -0.93 1.08 11210.63 1.00 
b_RULE_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED 0.22 0.54 -0.83 1.28 9962.34 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG -0.35 0.66 -1.59 0.99 11366.39 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_Ma
xG 
0.45 0.72 -0.92 1.88 15000.00 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM
_DG 
-0.68 0.66 -1.96 0.65 11962.63 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG 0.35 0.67 -1.00 1.64 12527.34 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG_X_AGE_
SQUARED 
-0.06 0.64 -1.32 1.21 12669.50 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG_X_A
GE_SQUARED 
0.10 0.72 -1.29 1.53 15000.00 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG_X_
AGE_SQUARED 
-0.19 0.63 -1.39 1.05 12675.44 1.00 
b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG_X_AGE_
SQUARED 
0.74 0.63 -0.48 2.00 11995.59 1.00 
sigma_Subject_ID 2.08 0.24 1.62 2.55 1973.08 1.00 
 
Model 2.rewards formula: 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ 1 + (1 |aid) +  
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(1+ Age*33PRIMED*(RIGHT_NORM_DG + RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ MAJORITY_NORM_DG + 
RULE_NORM_DG) + Age_Squared*33PRIMED*(RIGHT_NORM_DG + RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ 
MAJORITY_NORM_DG + RULE_NORM_DG)| Reward_Type) +  
Sex + Trial_Number + Age*33PRIMED*(RIGHT_NORM_DG + RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ 
MAJORITY_NORM_DG + RULE_NORM_DG) + Age_Squared*33PRIMED*(RIGHT_NORM_DG + 
RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ MAJORITY_NORM_DG + RULE_NORM_DG) 
 
Model.2.rewards <- map2stan(alist(  
 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER*TRIAL_NUMBER + b_AGE*AGE + b_33PRIMED*33PRIMED + 
b_RIGHT_NORM_DG*RIGHT_NORM_DG + b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG*RIGHT_NORM_MaxG+ 
b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG*MAJORITY_NORM_DG + b_RULE_NORM_DG*RULE_NORM_DG + 
























v_Subject_ID_Intercept[Subject_ID] + v_Reward_Type_Intercept[Reward_Type] + 










































Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED ~ dnorm(0,1), b_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_RULE_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_SQUARED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_33PRIMED ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_RULE_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_RIGHT_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), b_MAJORITY_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_RULE_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG 
~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED_X_RIGHT_NORM_MaxG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED_X_MAJORITY_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_33PRIMED_X_RULE_NORM_DG_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 

















DG_X_AGE_SQUARED)[Reward_Type] ~ dmvnorm2(0,sigma_Reward_Type,Rho_Reward_Type), 




Model 3 Formula:  
formula = Subject_chose_3/3 ~ 1 + (1 |aid) + Sex + Trial_Number + 33PRIMED + 
(Other_Child_Would_Choose + Teacher_Would_Choose + Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose) 
Model.3 <- map2stan(alist(  
 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + 






Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_Other_Child_Would_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), b_Teacher_Would_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), v_Intercept[Subject_ID] ~ 
dnorm(0,sigma_Subject_ID), sigma_Subject_ID ~ dcauchy(0,2)),data= testdata_trim_teacherwant, 
iter=50, chains=1) 
 
Model 3 Output: 
 
Mean StdDev lower 0.95 upper 0.95 n_eff Rhat 
Intercept -2.02 0.59 -3.19 -0.91 7713.60 1.00 
b_SEX 0.30 0.38 -0.47 1.03 5462.33 1.00 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER -0.29 0.10 -0.48 -0.09 9450.43 1.00 
b_33PRIMED 0.70 0.38 -0.03 1.46 5924.28 1.00 
b_Other_Child_Would_Choose 0.80 0.48 -0.15 1.73 5951.04 1.00 
b_Teacher_Would_Choose 0.60 0.47 -0.30 1.53 6637.84 1.00 
b_Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_
To_Choose 
1.06 0.49 0.09 2.01 7204.39 1.00 




Model 3.age Formula:  
formula = Subject_chose_3/3 ~ 1 + (1 |aid) + Sex + Trial_Number + 33PRIMED + Age 
* (Other_Child_Would_Choose + Teacher_Would_Choose + 
Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose) 
 
Model.3.age <- map2stan(alist(  
 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + 









Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_AGE ~ dnorm(0,1), b_Other_Child_Would_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_Teacher_Would_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), b_Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_Other_Child_Would_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_Teacher_Would_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), v_Intercept[Subject_ID] ~ 




Model 3.age Output:  
 
Mean StdDev lower 0.95 upper 
0.95 
n_eff Rhat 
Intercept -1.85 0.62 -3.09 -0.67 9258.79 1.00 
b_SEX 0.63 0.40 -0.17 1.39 6892.88 1.00 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER -0.23 0.11 -0.43 -0.02 12735.01 1.00 
b_33PRIMED 0.03 0.41 -0.80 0.83 7116.64 1.00 
b_AGE 0.64 0.45 -0.27 1.50 6177.03 1.00 
b_Other_Child_Would_Choose 0.85 0.49 -0.12 1.79 8045.32 1.00 
b_Teacher_Would_Choose 0.50 0.47 -0.39 1.46 8625.22 1.00 
b_Teacher_Would_Want_ 
Subject_To_Choose 
0.58 0.52 -0.43 1.59 9004.49 1.00 
b_AGE_X_Other_Child_Would_Choose 0.52 0.49 -0.44 1.47 8117.83 1.00 
b_AGE_X_Teacher_Would_Choose 0.02 0.45 -0.86 0.88 7933.63 1.00 
b_AGE_X_Teacher_Would_Want_ 
Subject_To_Choose 
0.41 0.48 -0.58 1.32 8137.16 1.00 




Model 4 Formula:  
formula = Subject_chose_3/3 ~ 1 + (1 |aid) + Sex + Trial_Number + 33PRIMED + 
(51_would_be_Wrong + 33_would_be_Wrong + 51_would_be_Fair + 
33_would_be_Fair) 
Model.4 <- map2stan(alist(  
 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER*TRIAL_NUMBER + b_33PRIMED*33PRIMED + 
b_51_would_be_Wrong*51_would_be_Wrong + b_33_would_be_Wrong*33_would_be_Wrong + 
b_51_would_be_Fair*51_would_be_Fair + b_33_would_be_Fair*33_would_be_Fair + 
v_Intercept[Subject_ID],  
 
Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_51_would_be_Wrong ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33_would_be_Wrong ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_51_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), v_Intercept[Subject_ID] ~ 
dnorm(0,sigma_Subject_ID), sigma_Subject_ID ~ dcauchy(0,2) 
),data= testdata_trim_judgement, iter=50, chains=1) 
 
 
Model 4 Output: 
  
Mean StdDev lower 0.95 upper 0.95 n_eff Rhat 
Intercept -0.73 0.64 -2.05 0.45 7492.97 1.00 
b_SEX 0.26 0.35 -0.43 0.94 5843.73 1.00 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER -0.24 0.09 -0.43 -0.07 15000.00 1.00 
b_33PRIMED 0.90 0.35 0.21 1.59 6725.39 1.00 
b_51_would_be_Wron
g 
1.54 0.43 0.69 2.40 6034.02 1.00 
b_33_would_be_Wron
g 
-0.86 0.54 -1.93 0.19 8548.48 1.00 
b_51_would_be_Fair -1.02 0.49 -1.95 -0.03 8631.31 1.00 
b_33_would_be_Fair -0.17 0.57 -1.24 0.98 8341.17 1.00 





Model 4.age Formula:  
formula = Subject_chose_3/3 ~ 1 + (1 |aid) + Sex + Trial_Number + 33PRIMED + Age 
* (51_would_be_Wrong + 33_would_be_Wrong + 51_would_be_Fair + 
33_would_be_Fair) 
Model.4.age <- map2stan(alist(  
 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER*TRIAL_NUMBER + b_33PRIMED*33PRIMED + b_AGE*AGE + 
b_51_would_be_Wrong*51_would_be_Wrong + b_33_would_be_Wrong*33_would_be_Wrong + 




b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Fair*AGE*33_would_be_Fair + v_Intercept[Subject_ID],  
 
Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_AGE ~ dnorm(0,1), b_51_would_be_Wrong ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33_would_be_Wrong ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_51_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_51_would_be_Wrong ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Wrong ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_51_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), 
v_Intercept[Subject_ID] ~ dnorm(0,sigma_Subject_ID), sigma_Subject_ID ~ dcauchy(0,2)),data= 
testdata_trim_judgement, iter=50, chains=1) 
 
 
Model 4.age Output:  
 
Mean StdDev lower 0.95 upper 0.95 n_eff Rhat 
Intercept -0.67 0.65 -1.92 0.62 8402.99 1.00 
b_SEX 0.34 0.34 -0.35 1.01 6946.76 1.00 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER -0.25 0.10 -0.44 -0.07 13068.42 1.00 
b_33PRIMED 0.69 0.34 0.00 1.32 7702.39 1.00 
b_AGE 0.84 0.55 -0.26 1.92 7065.16 1.00 
b_51_would_be_Wrong 1.54 0.42 0.72 2.36 7591.09 1.00 
b_33_would_be_Wrong -0.50 0.55 -1.57 0.58 8307.73 1.00 
b_51_would_be_Fair -0.82 0.49 -1.82 0.10 8528.69 1.00 
b_33_would_be_Fair -0.34 0.59 -1.52 0.80 8542.58 1.00 
b_AGE_X_51_would_be_Wrong -0.11 0.45 -0.99 0.77 7528.87 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Wrong 0.23 0.58 -0.90 1.38 9717.93 1.00 
b_AGE_X_51_would_be_Fair -0.58 0.46 -1.51 0.30 8978.64 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Fair 0.13 0.54 -0.94 1.20 6778.48 1.00 




Model 5 Formula: 
 
formula = Subject_chose_3/3 ~ 1 + (1 |aid) + Sex + Trial_Number + Age * 
Familiarization_Trial_Advantageous_Payoff + Age_Squared * 
Familiarization_Trial_Advantageous_Payoff 
Model.5 <- map2stan(alist(  
 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + 






_Payoff*AGE_SQUARED + v_Intercept[Subject_ID],  
 
Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_Familiarization_Trial_Advantageous_Payoff ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_Familiarization_Trial_Advantageous_Payoff ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_Familiarization_Trial_Advantageous_Payoff_X_AGE_SQUARED ~ dnorm(0,1), 
v_Intercept[Subject_ID] ~ dnorm(0,sigma_Subject_ID), sigma_Subject_ID ~ dcauchy(0,2) 
), data= famdata_trim, iter=50, chains=1) 
 
 









Intercept -0.13 0.62 -1.36 1.07 7372.78 1.00 
b_SEX 0.35 0.36 -0.34 1.06 11773.4
7 
1.00 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER -0.44 0.29 -1.01 0.12 4155.20 1.00 
b_AGE -0.43 0.43 -1.26 0.41 7489.50 1.00 
b_Familiarization_Trial_ 
Advantageous_Payoff 
-1.36 0.40 -2.12 -0.57 1484.59 1.00 
b_AGE_SQUARED -0.35 0.43 -1.18 0.50 7231.44 1.00 
b_AGE_X_Familiarization_Trial_ 
Advantageous_Payoff 




0.26 0.29 -0.30 0.82 7094.06 1.00 
sigma_Subject_ID 1.54 0.48 0.48 2.43 182.97 1.03 
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Model 6 Formula: 
formula = choice33_dv ~ 1 + (1|aid) + Sex + Age * (Teacher_Would_Choose + 
Adult_Would_Choose + Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose) 
Model.6 <- map2stan(alist(  
 
Subject_chose_3/3 ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + b_AGE*AGE + 







Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE ~ dnorm(0,1), b_Teacher_Would_Choose ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_Adult_Would_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), b_Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_Teacher_Would_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_Adult_Would_Choose ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose ~ dnorm(0,1), 
v_Intercept[Subject_ID] ~ dnorm(0,sigma_Subject_ID), sigma_Subject_ID ~ dcauchy(0,2)), data= 
other_choice_data, iter=50, chains=1) 
 
 
Model 6 Output: 
 
  





Intercept -1.56 0.28 -2.11 -1.01 6866.74 1.00 
b_SEX -0.13 0.30 -0.73 0.43 8942.76 1.00 
b_AGE 0.09 0.23 -0.36 0.55 8174.94 1.00 
b_Teacher_Would_Choose 2.21 0.29 1.67 2.80 6990.51 1.00 
b_Adult_Would_Choose 2.36 0.30 1.77 2.92 6836.61 1.00 
b_Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose 2.71 0.31 2.09 3.30 5837.54 1.00 
b_AGE_X_Teacher_Would_Choose 0.59 0.28 0.04 1.14 10852.26 1.00 
b_AGE_X_Adult_Would_Choose 0.97 0.29 0.39 1.53 10592.02 1.00 
b_AGE_X_Teacher_Would_Want_Subject_To_Choose 0.84 0.30 0.24 1.40 11164.26 1.00 









Model 7 Formula: 
formula = Subject_chose_Yes ~ 1 + (1|aid) + Sex + Trial_Number + Age *  
Other_Child_Would_Choose * (51_would_be_Wrong + 33_would_be_Wrong + 
51_would_be_Fair + 33_would_be_Fair) 
Model.7 <- map2stan(alist( 
 
Subject_chose_Yes ~ dbinom( 1 , p ), logit(p) <- Intercept + b_SEX*SEX + 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER*TRIAL_NUMBER + b_33PRIMED*33PRIMED + b_AGE*AGE + 
b_51_would_be_Wrong*51_would_be_Wrong + b_33_would_be_Wrong*33_would_be_Wrong + 




b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Fair*AGE*33_would_be_Fair + v_Intercept[Subject_ID], 
 
Intercept ~ dnorm(0,1), b_SEX ~ dnorm(0,1), b_TRIAL_NUMBER ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33PRIMED ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_AGE ~ dnorm(0,1), b_51_would_be_Wrong ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33_would_be_Wrong ~ 
dnorm(0,1), b_51_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), b_33_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_51_would_be_Wrong ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Wrong ~ dnorm(0,1), 
b_AGE_X_51_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Fair ~ dnorm(0,1), 
v_Intercept[Subject_ID] ~ dnorm(0,sigma_Subject_ID), sigma_Subject_ID ~ dcauchy(0,2)) 
 
 
Model 7 Output: 
 
Mean StdDev lower 0.95 upper 0.95 n_eff Rhat 
Intercept -0.67 0.65 -1.92 0.62 8402.99 1.00 
b_SEX 0.34 0.34 -0.35 1.01 6946.76 1.00 
b_TRIAL_NUMBER -0.25 0.10 -0.44 -0.07 13068.42 1.00 
b_33PRIMED 0.69 0.34 0.00 1.32 7702.39 1.00 
b_AGE 0.84 0.55 -0.26 1.92 7065.16 1.00 
b_51_would_be_Wrong 1.54 0.42 0.72 2.36 7591.09 1.00 
b_33_would_be_Wrong -0.50 0.55 -1.57 0.58 8307.73 1.00 
b_51_would_be_Fair -0.82 0.49 -1.82 0.10 8528.69 1.00 
b_33_would_be_Fair -0.34 0.59 -1.52 0.80 8542.58 1.00 
b_AGE_X_51_would_be_Wrong -0.11 0.45 -0.99 0.77 7528.87 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Wrong 0.23 0.58 -0.90 1.38 9717.93 1.00 
b_AGE_X_51_would_be_Fair -0.58 0.46 -1.51 0.30 8978.64 1.00 
b_AGE_X_33_would_be_Fair 0.13 0.54 -0.94 1.20 6778.48 1.00 
sigma_aid 1.58 0.24 1.13 2.05 1539.15 1.00 
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SOM Section 4: Details about Familiarization Phase 
In the Familiarization phase, children were presented with instructions and 
comprehension questions, along with two binary choices in which they obtained 
rewards. These two trials were primarily intended to just familiarize children with 
the procedure, but the payoffs were also structured ǯ
Advantageous and Disadvantageous inequity. The order of these trials was 
counterbalanced across subjects. 
At the beginning of the Familiarization phase, children were shown the four 
different kinds of rewards they would receive (Figure 4A). They were then told that 
they would be making choices that would deliver those rewards to themselves, and 
to a peer Recipient from their school. However, they would not know who the 
Recipient was. 
They were then shown six different paper bags (Figure 4B), and told that every time 
they made a choice the rewards that were to go to the Recipient would be placed in 
a different bag, and each bag would go to a different peer from their school. In other 
words, for each of their six choices (two choices in Familiarization, four choices in 
Test) they would be delivering rewards to a different Recipient. The experimenter 
then laid out the rewards corresponding to one of the to Familiarization payoff 
distributions (always using the Low-value Coins as rewards). The experimenter 
then asked a series of comprehension questions ǯ
understanding of the procedure (see SOM Section 2 for details): 
1. How many rewards would the Actor and Recipient receive if each tray were 
chosen?  
a. On the first Familiarization trial, 97% of Subjects correctly described 
how many rewards they and the Recipient would receive for each of 
the two payoff outcomes. 
b. On the second Familiarization Trial, 100% of Subjects correctly 
described how many rewards they and the Recipient would receive 
for each outcomes. 
2. Would the subject receive any ǯǫDid the subject ǯǫ 
a. On the first Familiarization Trial, 100% of Subjects correctly ǯǡ
they did not know who would. 
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Incorrect answers led the experimenter to repeat the relevant instructions. The 
Actor was then allowed to choose between the different payoff outcomes. The 
procedure was then repeated for the second familiarization trial. 
Actors generally chose the self-maximizing outcome (4/1 or 2/6; see Figure 5), even 
though this created a more-unequal outcome for them and the Recipient than if they 
had chosen the alternative outcomes (2/1 or 1/2). This bias towards self-
maximizing outcomes was consistent across age. This indicates that subjects must 
have clearly understood the task, because they showed a systematic bias towards 
one kind of outcome. This also indicates that children generally desired the rewards. 
However, it is inconsistent with children showing a general aversion to inequity, or 
to Inequity Aversion increasing with age. This is somewhat surprising, given the 
growing evidence for an aversion to inequity in young children (LoBue et al. 2011; 
Blake & McAuliffe 2011; McAuliffe et al. 2013; Fehr et al. 2008; Kogut 2012; Shaw & 
Olson 2012).  
Figure 5: Model predictions (from Model 5) ǯ	Trials 
(i.e., the Inequity Game payoff distributions). Blue corresponds to Disadvantageous Inequity 
Trials (y-axis reflects the probability of a 1/2 choice), and red corresponds to Advantageous 
Inequity Trials (y-axis reflects the probability of a 2/1 choice). Shaded regions represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
That said, Actors were generally more likely to choose more-equitable outcomes in 































4/1 vs. 2/1 : Advantageous
2/6 vs. 1/2 : Disadvantageous
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This suggests that Actors were more averse to Recipients obtaining relatively more 
than them, and they were less averse to themselves obtaining more than the 
Recipient. This is consistent with what we would expect given that individuals likely 
have stronger preferences concerning their own payoffs than those concerning the Ǥǯ
and Advantageous inequity appears only between about age 7 and 9.5 years. 
However, it should be noted that even though the relative cost of the more-equitable 
outcome is the same in both the Advantageous and Disadvantageous Inequity Trials 
(50%), the absolute cost is higher in the Advantageous Trial (2 Coins) than in the 
Disadvantageous Trials (1 Coin). It is possible that this difference in absolute cost 
could explain the differences in behavior across the two trials. 
Overall, the very-low rates of preference for more-equal outcomes is difficult to 
square with prior work on the development of Inequity Aversion. Incidentally, it is 
also inconsistent with the idea that the developmental increases in prosociality that ǯTrials is due to developmental increases in 
aversion to inequity. Part of the explanation for the low rates of aversion to inequity 
in the present study is likely to be that it was not designed specifically designed to 
test Inequity Aversion (remember, these were the Familiarization Trials, not the 
Test Trials). Our task and payoffs are more complicated than payoffs used in prior 
studies of this phenomenon, and at this point Subjects may still have been getting 




SOM Section 5: Details about Priming Phase 
In the Priming phase, children watched a video on a laptop (Figure 4C), which 
depicted an Adult (the Adult Model) participating in the identical task as the 
subjects (Figure 6). The Adult Model was always of the same sex as the Subject child. 
Across the 5 different Norm Conditions, children were presented with nearly 
identical videos, which differed only in the content of the statement that the adult 
model made during the video (Table 2, main text). The model never instructed the 
watching child which option to choose, and never actually made a choice. They 
instead simply commented on the two choices, either by providing information 
about which choice was normative (Right, Rule, Majority), or by providing no such 
information (No Norm Condition). 
Figure 6: Screen shot of one of the videos that Actors watched, depicted in Figure 4C. The 
video looked virtually the same in all Conditions, all that changed was the statement made by 
the Adult Model. 
 
The 5 Norm Conditions were presented between-subjects. Each Condition also 
included two between-subjects Treatments, which differed in whether the 3/3 
outcome was identified as the normative choice (Table 2, main text). For example, in 
the Right Norm DG (3/3) ǲ
one (3/ ?Ȍǡȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǳǡRight Norm DG (5/1) treatment the ǲȋ ?Ȁ ?Ȍǡȋ ?Ȁ ?ȌǤǳ 
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Differences across Treatments would indicate that the normative information in the 
video prime influences ǯown choices of 3/3, and thus their sharing 
behavior. Variation in the effect of Treatment across the different Norm Conditions 
would indicate how different kinds of normative framings (and payoff distributions) ǯes of the 3/3 outcome. 
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SOM Section 6: Details about Test Phase Design and Results 
In the Test phase, children were presented with four binary-choice trials, each with 
a different reward type. For the Right Norm DG, Rule Norm DG, Majority Norm DG, 
and No Norm DG conditions this was a 3/3 vs. 5/1 choice. For the Right Norm MaxG 
condition it was a 3/3 vs. 5/5 choice. The four reward types that children received 
were: gummie bears, glow-in-the-dark star stickers, low-value coins, and high value 
coins. Coins cǲǳ
school. Low-ǲ ?ǳǡ-ǲ ?ǳǤTo 
simplify the models and clarify prediction, primary analyses collapse the different 
reward types. Though there are some important ways in which reward type ǯǡ
reward types. ǯ 
SOM Section 8.   
As predicted, Actors indeed behaved differently across the Treatments (i.e., where 
either 3/3 or 5/1 was the primed ratio), and the effect of Treatment varied across 
Conditions (main text, Figure 3 and Figure 4). Specifically, children were more likely 
to choose 3/3 in the Right Norm DG (3/3) condition/treatment ȋǤǤǡǲȏ ?Ȁ ?Ȑǡȏ ?Ȁ ?ȐǳȌRight Norm DG (5/1) 
condition/treatment ȋǤǤǡǲȏ ?Ȁ ?Ȑǡȏ ?Ȁ ?ȐǳȌǤThis 
pattern emerges as early as 7.5-9 years of age. 
Though a similar effect of Treatment is not evident for the Majority Norm DG 
condition in Figure 3 (main text), this result may be due to differences in how 
information about majority behavior influences behavior across reward types (see 
SOM Section 8). This is the only situation where the type of reward appears to 
matter substantially, and it appears that a robust effect of Treatment in the Majority 
Norm DG condition exists only for the Low-value Coins. In general, this suggests that 
primes in the Majority Norm DG condition are overall less-effective than primes in 
the Right Norm DG condition, but further work will be needed to determine whether 
and why this is connected to reward type.  
Additionally, though there is no evidence of a substantial effect of Treatment in the 
models for the Rule Norm condition (main text, Figure 1), comparing the means 
using t-tests suggests that there may be an effect of Treatment for the very oldest 
children in the sample. Again, the overall pattern of results suggests that primes in 
the Rule Norm DG condition are overall less-effective than primes in the Right Norm 
DG condition, but further work will be needed to determine with certainty whether 
there is an effect of Treatment at all in the Rule Norm DG condition at the oldest 
ages.  
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We also see an effect of Treatment in the Right Norm MaxG condition (main text, 
Figure 4)ǡǯ-framed normative 
information is not specific to cooperative situations. However, closer examination 
suggests that the similarity in the model predictions for the Right Norm DG and 
Right Norm MaxG conditions emerges a bit later, after about 8-8.5 years of age. Prior 
to this point, Actors in the Right Norm MaxG (3/3) treatment are much less likely to 
choose 3/3 than are Actors in the Right Norm DG (3/3) treatment (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Model predictions (from Model 2) ǯRight Norm DG and 
MaxG treatments. Grey regions represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
These results tell us much about the development of prosocial behavior, and the 
relationship between prosocial development and normativity. Overall, German 
children aged 6 are very unlikely to select 3/3 (the prosocial outcome) over 5/1 (the 
selfish outcome). However, with increasing age they become substantially more 
prosocial. This indicates that, during this range of ages, children in this population 
are developing more costly prosocial behavior. 
At the earliest ages, children show no sensitivity to normative information. If you 
provide them with information indicating that either the prosocial or selfish choices 
are more normative, they are about equally likely to choose the prosocial choice 
themselves. By 7.5 years of age such a sensitivity to normative information emerges, 
along with evidence that different kinds of normative information have different 
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terms of what is right (Right Norm conditionȌǯ
behaviors more strongly than information framed in terms of how frequent a choice 
is (Majority Norm condition), and information framed as a rule (Rule Norm 
condition). ǡ ?Ǥ ?ǡǯ
behavior is becoming sensitive to indirect information about normative cooperative 
behavior, but particularly to normative information with a relatively more moral 
framing ȋǤǤǡǮǯȌ. 
Crucially, the influence of social norms is not tied to cooperative contexts. This ǯ ?Ȁ ?
context where it is the most prosocial outcome (Right Norm DG condition), and in a 
non-cooperative context where choosing 3/3 is worse for both the Actor and the 
Recipient, and thus makes little sense (Right Norm MaxG condition). After about 8.5 
years of age, there is no evidence of any differences in how normative information ǯRight Norm DG and MaxG conditions. However, 
at earlier ages, children are clearly more likely to select 3/3 in the Right Norm DG 
condition.  
This suggests that younger children may treat normative information as a 
potentially important cue, but not a sufficient reason (on its own) to select 3/3. 
Children aged 5 years and older understand contingent reciprocity in these kinds of 
experimental tasks (House, Henrich, et al. 2013), and would thus be capable of 
understanding that there can be strategic reasons to choose 3/3 in a cooperative 
dilemma. However, when not in a cooperative dilemma (Right Norm MaxG 
condition) there is no clear reason for selecting 3/3, and younger children may thus 
simply ignore the normative information. With age, though, children become more 
likely to conform to the norm regardless of context, even when the behavior it 
encourages makes little sense. 
Overall, these findings are strong evidence for the content-free, highly promiscuous 
normativity that we would expect based on the norm psychology perspective on 
prosocial development. Children show evidence of becoming sensitive to 
information about normative behavior in cooperative dilemmas, and evidence for 
this sensitivity emerges in middle childhood, the age at which we begin to see 
evidence of societal variation in prosocial development and cooperative behavior. 
Yet, importantly, we also see evidence that the influence of normative information is 
similar across cooperative and non-cooperative contexts. However, this similarity 
emerges only after about 8.5 years, and before this age children are perhaps less 
promiscuously normative, and more strategically normative. This might indicate a 
transitional period were children are first beginning to figure out why one ought to 
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ǡǯof conforming to norms even 
if their functions are not immediately obvious.  
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SOM Section 7: Did 7-year-olds attend to the videos? 
It is possible that the 6-7 year-old children in our sample simply did not pay 
attention to our priming videos, and that is why they were not influenced by the 
normative information in the priming statement. To explore this possibility we ran a 
small sample of 16 7 year-olds in a different version of the No Norm DG condition, 
called the Frog Control.  
During the Frog Control the experimental procedure and apparatus is the same as in 
the No Norm DG condition with only a few exceptions. The apparatus and setup is 
identical, except a toy duck and a toy frog are placed in the center of the testing area 
(as depicted in Figure 8). However, these toys were not mentioned during the 
instructions. 
In the No Norm DG condition, the Adult Model states in the priming videoǣǲI can 
choose this one or this one.ǳ 	ǡǣǲI can choose ǳǡ
The only difference at this point in the video is that the video also includes the same 
toy duck and toy frog in the center of the testing area (Figure 8). 
 





At this point, the video for the No Norm DG condition simply ended, but the video 
for the Frog Control continued. Now the Adult Model reached over and picked up 
the toy Frog (Figure 9) ǣǲǥ I must put the Frog on the one that I 
chooseǤǳ 
Figure 9: Second part of the Frog Control video, which differs from the No Norm DG condition. 
 
 
The experiment then continued just as in the No Norm DG condition. Once more, 
note that at no point did the Experimenter instruct the Subject to do anything with 
the toy frog. The only information about whether and how to use the frog came from ǯǤ  
8 out of 16 Subjects spontaneously used the frog when selecting one of the two 
choices, on at least one of the four Test Trials. 
At the end of the Test Phase, the experimenter asked the Subject: ǲWhat did the 
man/woman in the video say?ǳ 
Of the 8 Subjects who did not spontaneously use the frog in the Test Trials, 7 
spontaneously referenced the frog in ǯ
statement. 
For the 1 Subject who neither spontaneously used nor referred to the frog, we asked ǣǲȀǫǳǯǤ 
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Out of 16 7-year-old Subjects, 15 either spontaneously used or referenced the frog 
correctly, even though this information could only have come from the priming 
video. The 1 remaining Subject also likely acquired this information from the video. 
This makes it unlikely that 7-year-ǯtive information in 
the priming videos is due to them being inattentive to the videos. It is likely that ǡǯǡ
heard the normative information. They were simply indifferent to that information.  
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SOM Section 8: Analyzing how ActŽƌƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌŝƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇZeward type 
For each of the four trials during the Test Phase, children made the same binary 
choice in terms of the payoff distribution (3/3 vs. 5/1, or 3/3 vs. 5/5), but the 
choices were made with different kinds of rewards: gummie bears (Food), glow-in-
the-dark sȋȌǡ ?ǲǳ
brought to the school (Low-value Coins), and red tokens worth 2 units (High-value 
Coins). We used different rewards because it makes it easier to presenting each 
subject with multiple trials (using the same rewards in the same task might lead the ǮǯȌǤ
for using different rewards is that ǯ
prosocial behavior responds differently to the different kinds of rewards.  
Different studies of prosocial development frequently use very different kinds of 
rewards, which range from food to stickers to tokens/money. It is still an open 
question whether the kind of reward matters (Food, Stickers, Coins), and whether 
the value of the reward matters (Low-value Coins, High-value Coins). If we find that 
different kinds of rewards, or different reward values, qualitatively change the 
developmental patterns that we observe, then this would greatly impact our 
understanding and interpretation of the current study and prior studies of the 
development of prosocial behavior. 
For the primary analyses in the main text, the models collapse these four reward 
types. However, here we analyze how childrǯ, using 
a mixed effects regression model that includes random effects/slopes for each of the Ǥǯ
each reward type. Figure 10 ǯǡ
the No Norm DG condition only. This is useful because the No Norm DG condition 
provides no normative information, and is thus our most pure ǯ
prosocial behavior.  
We can see that in both the 3/3 Treatment and the 5/1 Treatment, the development 
of prosocial behavior follows the same pattern regardless of whether the rewards 
are Food, Stickers, or Low-value Coins. Children were relatively less likely to be 
prosocial with the High-value Coins, but the overall developmental trajectory is 
qualitatively similar. This is important ǯǯǤǯte rates of prosocial behavior, but it largely 
doesǯt change the effects of Condition and Treatment that we have reported. 
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Figure 10: Model predictions (from Model 2.rewards) ǯNo Norm DG 
condition. Comparing predictions across rewards, within treatments. Grey regions represent 
the 95% Confidence intervals for the Low-value Coin rewards. 
 
This same result can also be seen in Figure 11, which presents the same model 
results as in Figure 10, except now directly comparing the different Treatments for 
each reward type. Children show an increasing tendency to be prosocial in all 
reward types, but do not substantially distinguish between the Treatments for any 
rewards. It is true that for the Low-value Coins, at about age 9.5 years, children may 
be less likely to select 3/3 in the 5/1 Treatment, but this is not a substantial effect 
and it is not consistent with the other rewards. This would need replication, and if it 
is it would suggest a slight order/primacy effect in children of this age, whereby 
they are somewhat more likely to select the outcome that is indicated first.  A similar 
overall pattern is observed in the Rule Norm DG condition (Figure 14), with children 
being relatively unlikely to distinguish the Treatments for any of the rewards, but 
there perhaps being a slight treatment effect at about age 9 years for the Low-value 
Coins. The similarities across the Control and Rule Norm DG conditions suggest that 
an order effect might drive the effect of Treatment in the Rule Norm DG condition, as 
well. 
Similar developmental patterns are also observed across reward types in the Right 
Norm DG condition (Figure 12). Qualitatively similar patterns can be seen across 


























































Intriguingly, in the Majority Norm DG Condition there is a robust effect of Treatment 
for Low-value Coins, but not for the other reward types (Figure 15).  
Figure 11: Model predictions (from Model 2.rewards) ǯNo Norm DG 
condition, separately for the different rewards. Comparing predictions across treatments, for 
each reward type. Grey regions represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Overall, this analysis suggests that children generally respond similarly to the 
different rewards, as there are relatively few differences across Food, Stickers, and 
Low-value Coins. Children are less likely to be prosocial when presented with High-
value Coins, but they nonetheless display relatively similar effects of Treatment.  
The major exception is in the Majority Norm DG condition, and it is not clear why 
the effect of Treatment should be limited to the Low-value Coins. However, Figure 
16 indicates that variation across reward types is limited to the 5/1 Treatment. In 
the 5/1 Treatment, children are much less prosocial for the Coins (in this, we see a 
qualitatively similar pattern across the Low- and High-value Coins) than they are for 
the Food and Stickers. By contrast, in the 3/3 Treatment, there is little apparent 
variation in how prosocial children are across the different rewards. This suggests ǲ ?Ȁ ?ǳeducing 
prosocial distributions of Food and Stickers, but it is very effective at reducing 
prosocial distributions of the Coins. Overall, this analysis explains why the 
confidence intervals are enormous for the Majority Norm DG (5/1) condition 







































































































Whatever the reason for this variation in behavior across reward types, this effect of 
Treatment for the Low-value Coins in the Majority Norm DG condition is as robust 
as anything seen in the other Conditions. This indicates that the lack of an effect of 
Treatment in the Majority Norm DG condition in Table 3 and Figure 2 (main text) is 
not due to information about majority choices necessarily being less influential than 
information about what is right to do. Instead, it is more likely due to information 
about what the majority does being influential only with Low-value Coins. 
Interestingly, the slight hints of effects of Treatment in the Rule Norm and No Norm 
DG conditions are also with the Low-value Coins. Though we do not have a clear idea 
of why this might be the case, it could potentially be due to the fact that children had 
more experience with the Low-value Coins, as these were the rewards used in the 
Familiarization Trials, as well. In any case, these results suggest that future research 
might focus on using Coins (i.e., focus on using tokens as proximate rewards), as this 
appears to be the reward that produces the most robust effects of Treatment across 
different framings for normative information. 
 
Figure 12: Model predictions (from Model 2.rewards) ǯRight Norm DG 
condition, separately for the different rewards. Comparing predictions across treatments, for 









































































































Figure 13: Model predictions (from Model 2.rewards) ǯRight Norm 
MaxG condition, separately for the different rewards. Comparing predictions across 
treatments, for each reward type. 
 
Figure 14: Model predictions (from Model 2.rewards) ǯchoices in the Rule Norm DG 
condition, separately for the different rewards. Comparing predictions across treatments, for 











































































































































































































Figure 15ǣȋ ?ǤȌǯMajority Norm 
DG condition, separately for the different rewards. Comparing predictions across treatments, 
for each reward type.  
 
Figure 16ǣȋ ?ǤȌǯMajority Norm 
DG condition. Comparing predictions across rewards, within treatments. Grey regions 
































































































































































SOM Section 9: Interview Phase 
After the test phase, in the Interview phase children were asked a series of 
questions about the reward choices, always presented in this fixed order (Table 8). 
The questions were standardized in this way to try, as much as possible, to create a ǯǤ 
Table 8: Interview questions. See SOM Section 2 for script. 
Question # Question 
1 What would another child choose? 
2 Would this choice be Wrong? 
3 Would the other choice be Wrong? 
4 Would this choice be Fair? 
5 Would the other choice be Fair? 
6 What would an adult choose? 
7 What would your teacher choose? 
8 What would your teacher want YOU to choose? 
 
 
The interview asked children to predict what others (another child, an adult, and 
their teacher) would choose if presented with the same cooperative dilemma that 
they have been give. It also asks children to predict what their teacher would want Ǥǯ others would 
choose 3/3 or 5/1, together with their predictions that their teacher would want 
them to choose 3/3 or 5/1. Not all Actors were able to provide a response to all 
questions, and we excluded Actors who did not respond to both questions, and 
Actors in the Right Norm MaxG condition. The model estimates are plotted in Figure 
17.  
Figure 17ǣǯ(from Model 6) about the likely prosocial behavior of other 
children, adults, and teachers. Also, their predictions about what their teacher would want 
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The interview also asked Actors to judge ǲǳǲǳ ?Ȁ ? ?Ȁ ?Ǥǯ
questions 2-4 (Table 8) to represent their judgments of whether 3/3 and 5/1 were ǲǳǲǳǤls used these judgments as 
the data, and controlled for whether Actors had predicted another child would 
choose 3/3 or 5/1. We excluded data from Actors who did not give all four of these 
judgments, and who were in the Right Norm MaxG condition. 
In general, at the youngest ages Actors were more likely to say that both 5/1 and 
3/3 were fair, and less likely to say that they were wrong (Figure 18). With 
increasing age, this pattern strengthened dramatically for 3/3, and by the oldest 
ages almost all children said that 3/3 was fair, and almost none said that it was 
wrong (right panel, Figure 18). In contrast, with increasing age this pattern 
diminished substantially for 5/1. At the oldest ages, children were equally unlikely 
to say that 5/1 was fair or that it was wrong (left panel, Figure 18).  
Figure 18ǣǯ (from Model 7) ǲǳǲǳ
another child to choose 3/3 or 5/1. Grey regions represent 95% confidence intervals. Both 
panels, n=196. 
 
 ǯsponses to the interview questions predicted their actual 
choices in the Test Trials, we again excluded data from children who did not answer 
all the relevant interview questions, and those in the Right Norm MaxG condition. 
This substantially reduced the dataset, so to increase degrees of freedom we 
collapsed the data from the different Conditions and Treatments, and removed age 





















































choices of 3/3. Actors were not reliably more likely to choose 3/3 if they believed 
that another child would choose 3/3, or that their teacher would choose 3/3 (Table 
4, main text). However, Actors were more likely to choose 3/3 if they believed their 
teacher would want them to choose 3/3. Additional models including age 
interactions suggest that this tendency emerges around 9.5 years of age (Figure 19).  
Figure 19: ǯbeliefs about the prosocial behavior of others impacts their 
prosocial behavior in the Test Trials, across development (from Model 3.age). Grey regions 
represent 95% confidence intervals. All panels, n=128.  
 ǯ ?Ȁ ? ?Ȁ ?ǲǳǲǳ
their own choices of 3/3. Actors were substantially more likely to choose 3/3 if they 
believed that 5/1 was wrong (Table 5, main text). They were also less likely to 























































































































choices of 3/3 in this task.  
Figure 20: ǯ ?Ȁ ? ?Ȁ ?ǲǳ
ǲǳacts their prosocial behavior in the Test Trials, across development (from Model 
4.age). Grey regions represent 95% confidence intervals. All panels, n=128. 
 ǯ
in prosocial development. Children show no confidence at any age that their peers 
would be prosocial in our Dictator Game task, and probably greatly underestimate 
how prosocial their peers actually are (at least at the oldest ages in the sample). ǯǯ
reliably predict their own prosocial choices.  
In contrast, with increasing age children show a dramatic increase in their 
expectations of prosocial behavior by their teacher and other adults. Children also 
show an identical developmental pattern in their beliefs about whether their 
teacher (and, perhaps by extension, all other adults) would want them to be Ǥǡǯ
their beliefs about whether or not their teacher would themselves be prosocial, but 
instead by their beliefs about whether their teacher would want them to be 


















































































































































least some substantial part of the developmental change in prosocial behavior that ǯ
community expect them to do. ǯǲǳǲǳ
very important. Remember that these beliefs are based on questions about whether ǲǳǲǳȋȌ ?Ȁ3 or  ?Ȁ ?Ǥ ?Ȁ ?ǲǳǡǲǳǤage, 3/3 is judged as both more-fair and less 
wrong, and at the oldest ages there is very little variation in these judgments. ǡ ?Ȁ ?ǲǳǲǤǳǡ
disappears, and at the oldest ages children are equally unlikely to affirm that 5/1 is ǲǳǲǤǳ
not ǲǳare ǲǤǳ ǯ ?Ȁ ?ǯwn prosocial behavior. Given the data, this must be 
true: children are far from universally prosocial in this task, despite being nearly  ?Ȁ ?Ǥǡǯ
beliefs about the selfish outcome appeǯǤǲǳ
prosocial, a pattern that emerges by 7-7.5 years of age. Those that believe that the ǲǳely to be prosocial, though the pattern is 
relatively weaker and emerges by about 9.5 years. While it is certainly intuitive that ǯ
behavior, these results indicate that in the preseǯ
behavior is more strongly shaped by their beliefs about the selfish outcome. 
This provides ǯ
prosocial and selfish behavior, and how these beliefs shape the course of prosocial 
development. ǯ own prosocial choices are predicted most clearly by what 
they believe their teachers (and perhaps all other adults) would want them to 
choose in our cooperative dilemma, and not as reliably by what they expect peers 
and adults to actually choose in the task. The influence of their predictions of their ǯ ?Ǥ ?ǡǯ
willingness to conform to normative information regardless of context or 
sensiblǡǯ
general (at about 7-7.5 years). This is consistent with the idea that there is a period 
of strategic normativity prior to about age 9.5, while after age 9.5 children shift 
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towards a more promiscuous normativity, wherein they strongly conform to both 
information about normative behavior and their perceptions of the behavior 
expected by reliable social models (adults, teachers). ǡǡǯǲǳǲǳ
choices. This is not because children were confused about the questions, they 
reported mutually coherent beliefs that the prosocial outcome is both fair and not 
wrong. Children show less coherence in their beliefs about the status of the selfish 
outcome: with increasing age they are increasingly likely to report it is neither fair 
nor wrong. Yet, again children are not confused, as their beliefs about the ǲǳǲǳ
choices in a sensible manner. Children appear to have been drilled into a uniform 
belief that being prosocial is both fair and not wrong, but we cannot detect that this ǯȋǡȌǤǡǯǲǳǲǳǡ
substantial impact on their prosocial choices.  
